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A classical view of currency crises is that they arise because governments print money to
￿nance ongoing or prospective de￿cits.1 Models embodying this view generally predict that
seigniorage should rise signi￿cantly in the aftermath of a currency crisis. Table 1, which
reports data for six recent currency crises, indicates that this prediction is inconsistent with
the data. This evidence raises two questions:
￿ How do governments actually pay for the ￿scal costs associated with currency crises?
￿ What are the implications of diﬀerent ￿nancing methods for post-crisis rates of in￿ation
and depreciation?
We address these questions using a general equilibrium model in which a currency crisis
is triggered by prospective government de￿cits.2 We then use our model in conjunction with
￿scal data to interpret government ￿nancing in the wake of three recent currency crises:
Korea (1997), Mexico (1994), and Turkey (2001).
Generating empirically plausible answers to our two questions requires that we adopt
a formulation of the government￿s budget constraint that is more realistic than the highly
stylized representations typically used in the literature. Standard models assume, for con-
venience, that the only source of depreciation-related revenue available to a government is
seigniorage. In reality governments have access to other types of depreciation-related rev-
enue. First, they can de￿ate the dollar value of outstanding nonindexed debt.3 Second,
they can engage in what we call an ￿implicit ￿scal reform￿. Such a reform arises when some
government expenditures are denominated in units of the local currency. As long as the
government does not raise these expenditures at the rate of depreciation their dollar value
declines. This ￿implicit ￿scal reform￿ can be quantitatively important even if government
1See, for example, Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1986), Calvo (1987), Drazen
and Helpman (1987), Wijnbergen (1991), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (2001), and Lahiri and VØgh (2003).
2Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2003) provides a preliminary discussion of these questions using
a simple reduced form model featuring a Cagan (1956) money demand function, a simpli￿ed government
budget constraint, and preliminary data from Korea and Mexico.
3The importance of nonindexed debt has been emphasized in the literature on the ￿scal theory of the
price level. Sims (1994), Woodford (1995) and Cochrane (2001) discuss the ￿scal theory in a closed economy
context. Dupor (2000), Daniel (2001), and Corsetti and Mackowiak (2002) analyze the implications of the
￿scal theory for open economies.
1expenditures rise at the same rate as domestic in￿ation. This is because post-crisis in￿ation
rates are often much lower than the rate of depreciation (see Table 2).
Our empirical analysis indicates that debt de￿ation and implicit ￿scal reforms are more
important than seigniorage, at least in the ￿rst few years after a crisis. Our theoretical
analysis shows that, once these sources of revenue are incorporated into the model, we can
account for government ￿nancing in a way that is consistent with post-crisis rates of in￿ation
and depreciation.
We consider a standard small open economy model populated by a representative, in￿-
nitely lived agent who can borrow and lend at a ￿x e di n t e r e s tr a t ei nw o r l dc a p i t a lm a r k e t s .
Agents in the economy consume tradable and nontradable goods and receive endowments of
both goods. In addition to allowing for nonindexed public debt and government spending, we
assume that some government spending is on nontradable goods. This is important because
in reality the dollar price of nontradable goods falls dramatically in the aftermath of a cur-
rency crisis (see Table 3). This fall has two eﬀects on the government￿s intertemporal budget
constraint. First, it lowers the dollar value of taxes collected from the nontradable sector.
This eﬀect underlies the conventional wisdom that a devaluation leads to a deterioration of
the government￿s ￿scal position.4 Second, the fall in the dollar price of nontradables reduces
the dollar value of government expenditures on nontradable goods. This second eﬀect, which
has not been stressed in the literature, leads to an improvement of the government￿s ￿scal
position. Since most governments￿ expenditures are on nontradable goods (e.g. health and
education), the latter eﬀect may, in practice, be very important.
Consistent with the data, we also assume that nontradable prices are sticky for a brief
period of time. In addition, we suppose that distributing tradable goods requires the use of
nontradable distribution services (retailing, wholesaling, and transportation). Given these
assumptions, the model implies that the rate of depreciation in the ￿rst year after the crisis
is larger than the rate of in￿ation. The presence of this wedge magni￿es the post-crisis
reduction in the dollar value of transfers and government purchases. This decline goes a long
way toward oﬀsetting the fall in the dollar value of taxes.
We show that a version of our model calibrated to Korean data is consistent with the post-
crisis behavior of in￿ation and depreciation rates in Korea. In terms of government ￿nance,
seigniorage accounts for less than 15 percent of the ￿scal costs associated with the crisis.
4This deterioration may be less severe in countries where taxes on commodity exports are an important
source of revenue. See Pinto (1990), Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), and Morris (1995) for a discussion.
2The balance is paid for through a reduction in the dollar value of transfer payments and,
to a lesser extent, debt de￿ation. The model implies that if all debt and transfer payments
had been indexed to the dollar, Korea￿s post-crisis in￿ation would have been dramatically
diﬀerent. Speci￿cally, in the ￿rst year of the crisis in￿ation would have been more than twice
as high, while long run in￿ation would have risen by a factor a ten.
The central feature of our model is that governments have at their disposal a menu of
depreciation-related revenues. To assess the importance of these alternative revenue sources
we conduct detailed case studies of how Korea, Mexico and Turkey ￿nanced the costs as-
sociated with their recent currency and banking crises.5 In practice this is a diﬃcult task
because one must compare actual revenues and expenditures with what they would have been
absent the crisis. While our precise quantitative results are sensitive to these assumptions,
we have con￿dence in the basic qualitative patterns that emerge. These can be summarized
as follows. First, none of these countries has fully paid for all of the costs associated with
their currency crisis. Second, in no case has seigniorage been the dominant source of rev-
enue. Third, for all three countries, debt de￿ation has been more important than seigniorage.
Fourth, consistent with conventional wisdom, there was a substantial decline in the dollar
value of tax revenues after the crisis in all three countries. However, the decline in the dollar
value of government purchases was important in oﬀsetting the tax revenue decline. Finally,
there were large declines in the dollar value of transfers. Indeed, these declines were the
single most important source of revenue in Korea and Mexico.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the government
budget constraint. Section 3 embeds this budget constraint into a general equilibrium model
of a currency crisis. Section 4 presents the properties of the model. In section 5 we summarize
the results of our case studies. Finally, section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2. The Government Budget Constraint
Explicit default aside, a government must satisfy its lifetime budget constraint. In this
section, we derive a version of this constraint that is useful for discussing the diﬀerent
strategies that a government can use to pay for the ￿scal costs associated with a currency
crisis. This requires distinguishing between traded and nontraded goods. Since the prices of
5See Persson, Persson and Svensson (1998) for a careful analysis of the eﬀects of in￿ation on the budget
constraint of the Swedish government that considers in￿ation-related sources of revenue other than seignior-
age.
3these goods play an important role in our analysis, we begin by laying out our notation and
assumptions about purchasing power parity (PPP).
Purchasing Power Parity Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002) argue that for large
devaluations PPP is a reasonable assumption for the producer price of tradable goods. In
light of this we assume that:
ﬂ P
T
t = St ﬂ P
T∗
t . (2.1)
Here ﬂ P T
t and ﬂ P T∗
t denote the domestic and foreign producer price of tradable goods, re-
spectively. The variable St denotes the exchange rate de￿ned as units of local currency per
dollar. For convenience, we abstract from foreign in￿ation so ﬂ P T∗
t =1and ﬂ P T
t = St.
It is well known that PPP does not hold at the level of the CPI. Here we emphasize two
reasons for this failure of PPP: nontradable goods and distribution costs associated with the








Here ω i st h ew e i g h to ft r a d a b l eg o o d si nt h ei n d e x ,PN
t is the price of nontradable goods,
and PT
t is the retail price of tradable goods.
We introduce distribution costs (wholesaling, retailing, and transportation) by assuming
that selling one unit of the tradable good requires using δ units of the nontradable good.6
Given perfect competition in the retail sector, the retail price of tradable goods is:
P
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As long as δ > 0, PPP does not hold at the retail level.
The Government’s Flow Budget Constraint Government spending, other than on
interest payments, consists of purchases of tradable and nontradable goods as well as transfer
payments. In period t, the government purchases gT
t units of tradables and gN
t units of
nontradables. We assume that the government purchases goods at producer prices.7 Total









6See Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2002), Corsetti and Dedola (2002), and Burstein, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (2002).
7This is consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2002).
4The government makes two types of transfers to domestic households: transfers indexed
to the CPI, ￿ vt, and transfers indexed to the exchange rate, ￿ vt. Total domestic transfer
payments, in local currency, are Pt￿ vt + St￿ vt. The government also transfers v∗
t dollars to
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∗
t. (2.5)
The government ￿nances its expenditures by collecting taxes, printing money, and issuing
debt. We assume that the government collects taxes on the output at rate τy. The dollar
value of tax revenues at time t, τt,i sg i v e nb y :
τt = τ











t denote exogenous endowments of output in the tradable and nontradable
sectors, respectively, and τL
t represents lump-sum taxes. We allow for diﬀerential tax rates
to account for the fact that: (i) some nontradable goods (e.g. health care and education) are
often provided by the government and are only partially taxed; and (ii) in many countries
it may be easier to evade paying taxes on nontradable goods and services.
The stock of domestic money is denoted by Mt. The government￿s seigniorage revenue
at date t is œ Mt i nl o c a lc u r r e n c yo r œ Mt/St in dollar terms. Throughout the paper œ xt denotes
dx/dt. Real money balances measured in dollars are denoted by mt ≡ Mt/St.
The government can borrow and lend in dollars at a ￿xed interest rate, r.T h es t o c ko f
dollar-denominated bonds at time t is denoted by bt. We assume that before agents foresee
any possibility of a devaluation the government issues a ￿xed stock of consols with a face
value of B units of local currency and coupon rate r.
The government￿s ￿ow budget constraint is:
∆bt = −∆mt,
œ bt = rbt + rB/St + gt + vt − τt − œ Mt/St,
if t ∈ I,
if t/ ∈ I.
(2.7)
As in Drazen and Helpman (1987), (2.7) takes into account the possibility of discrete changes
in mt and bt at a ￿nite set of points in time, I. Below we list the points in time at which
these discrete changes might occur.
The Government’s Lifetime Budget Constraint The ￿ow budget constraint, (2.7),























This constraint requires that the initial dollar value of the debt plus the present value of
consol payments measured in dollars be equal to the present value, in dollars, of primary
surpluses plus seigniorage revenue.
A Sustainable Fixed Exchange Rate Regime We assume that, for all t<0, St = S
and agents believe that this ￿xed exchange rate regime is sustainable. In particular, we sup-
pose agents anticipate that the government will satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint,
(2.8), without abandoning the ￿xed exchange rate at any date t ≥ 0. Given PPP, (2.1),
this is equivalent to agents believing that the government will pursue ￿scal and monetary
policies consistent with zero in￿ation in the producer price of tradables.
To simplify, we assume that for all t<0, gT
t = gT, gN
t = gN, ￿ vt =￿ v, ￿ vt =￿ v, v∗
t = v∗ =0 ,
τL
t = τL, yT
t = yT,a n dyN
t = yN. These assumptions imply that in equilibrium the price
of nontradables, the CPI, and the nominal money supply are also constant: PN
t = P N,
Pt = P =( S + δP N)ω(P N)1−ω and Mt = M. Agents believe that these variables will
continue to be constant for t ≥ 0. Under these assumptions the government￿s lifetime





τ − g − v
r
. (2.9)
Here τ, g,a n dv are constants given by (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6). Equation (2.9) requires that
the present value of current and future real primary surpluses equals the initial real net
liabilities of the government.
AC r i s i s At t =0agents learn that the government will have to increase its future dollar
transfers to domestic residents and foreigners, say, because of loan guarantees to the creditors









We assume that these new transfers will not be ￿nanced with an explicit ￿scal reform. By
such a reform we mean changes in gT
t , gN
t , ￿ vt,o rτy that would oﬀset the eﬀects of the increase
in dollar transfers. As shown below, this implies that the ￿xed exchange rate regime must
be abandoned.
6At time zero agents also learn the new paths of tradable and nontradable output. We
assume that tax rates, as opposed to tax revenues, remain constant. This assumption is
consistent with the observation that explicit tax reforms are relatively minor in the aftermath
of currency crises.
To see the impact of the crisis on the government￿s lifetime budget constraint we use














































According to (2.10), the present value of the increase in transfers must be ￿nanced by
changes in the dollar value of: (i) tax revenues; (ii) government expenditures; (iii) CPI-
indexed transfers; (iv) nonindexed debt; and (v) seigniorage revenues. We discuss each of
these components in turn.
Since we excluded explicit ￿scal reforms, the only way in which the government can
satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint is to use monetary policy to generate depreciation-
related revenues.8 To see this, suppose for the moment that the ￿xed exchange rate could
be sustained once new information about higher de￿cits arrived. Then the money supply
would never change and the government could not collect any seigniorage revenues. This
in conjunction with the fact that the price level would be ￿xed, implies that all of the
terms on the right hand side of (2.10) would equal zero.9 But then the government￿s budget
constraint would not hold which contradicts the assumption that the ￿xed exchange rate
regime is sustainable. We conclude that the government must at some point move to a
￿oating exchange rate system or, at least, abandon its peg at the ￿xed rate S.
8The government can also explicitly default on outstanding debt. We ignore this possibility since we
are interested in episodes in which explicit default did not occur. International bailouts are an additional
source of crisis ￿nancing, but in practice the value of these bailouts is not very signi￿cant. See Jeanne and
Zettelmeyer (2000) who show that the subsidy component of IMF programs is quite small.
9This statement assumes that tax revenue does not change absent a devaluation.
7Tax Eﬀects

















t ]dt − τ/r. (2.11)
Recall that we assumed tax rates are constant. If yN
t , yT
t ,a n dτL
t were constant and PN
t /St
did not change, this term would be zero. We do not expect either of these conditions to
hold, in general. First, large devaluations are typically followed by signi￿cant changes in
the output of the tradable and nontradable sectors. Second, as documented in Table 3,
devaluations are also followed by large drops in the dollar price of nontradable goods. These
eﬀects can lead to either a ￿scal improvement or a ￿scal deterioration. For example, a drop
in the value of nontradable output (PN
t yN
t /St) induces a decline in real tax revenues, thus
exacerbating the ￿scal consequences of the initial crisis. On the other hand, if most tax
revenue comes from the tradable sector and this sector booms after a devaluation, there
could be a net rise in the present value of tax revenues.
Government Purchases Eﬀects



























t remain constant at their pre-crisis values. If P N
t /St also remained
constant then the term above would be zero. But a drop in P N
t /St generates an automatic
decline in the dollar value of government spending on nontradable goods. This type of
automatic ￿scal reform is important because most government purchases are on nontradables,
such as health and education.
Government Transfers Eﬀects












Suppose ￿ vt remained constant at its pre-crisis value. If Pt/St also remained constant then
t h et e r ma b o v ew o u l db ez e r o .B u ta n yd r o pi nPt/St generates an automatic decline in the
dollar value of CPI-indexed transfers.
8Nonindexed Debt Eﬀects










Other things equal, a devaluation generates an implicit ￿scal reform by reducing the value
of this debt. This channel has been emphasized in the literature on the ￿scal theory of the
price level.10
Seigniorage Eﬀects










The post-crisis behavior of in￿ation depends critically on the ￿nancing mix chosen by
the government. For example, suppose that the government could pay for most of its ￿scal
costs by reducing the dollar value of outstanding nominal debt with a devaluation at time
zero. Then the currency crisis would be associated with little future money growth or long-
run in￿ation. In contrast, suppose that the government ￿nanced most of the new transfers
with seigniorage revenues. This ￿nancing strategy would have very diﬀerent implications for
money growth and in￿ation.
It is also clear that post-crisis in￿ation rates depend on the types of goods that the
government purchases and on the nature of the tax system. Suppose, for example, that the
government raises most of its tax revenues from the nontradable sector and the dollar value
of production in this sector falls precipitously after a devaluation. Then a devaluation would
magnify the initial ￿scal crisis so that money growth rates and in￿ation would be higher than
otherwise. In contrast, suppose that most government spending is devoted to nontradable
goods. Then a crisis which leads to a decline in P N
t /St generates a ￿scal improvement.
To go beyond these general statements and formally analyze the implications of diﬀer-
ent ￿nancing strategies, we must embed the government￿s budget constraint into a fully
articulated model.
10See footnote 3 for related references.
93. The Model












t denote the consumption of tradables and nontradables, respectively. In
addition ρ > 0 is the discount factor and σ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
The representative agent can borrow and lend in international capital markets at a con-
stant real interest rate r. To eliminate trends in the current account we assume that r = ρ.
The representative agent￿s ￿ow budget constraint for t ≥ 0 is given by:
∆ft = −∆mt if t ∈ I,




t )/St − τt − œ Mt/St if t/ ∈ I.
(3.2)




represents the dollar value of the household￿s endowments of tradable and nontradable goods.
As with the government, the household￿s budget constraint (3.2) takes into account the
possibility of discrete changes in mt and ft at a ￿n i t es e to fp o i n t si nt i m e ,I.T h e ￿ow
budget constraint, together with the condition limt→∞ e−rtft =0 , implies the following






















According to (3.3), when measured in dollars, the household￿s initial assets plus the present
value of endowment and transfer income must equal the present value of expenditures inclu-
sive of taxes and changes in money balances.
Finally, the representative agent faces the following continuous time analogue to a cash-









t ) ≤ Mt. (3.4)
The constant η allows the model to generate empirically plausible predictions for average
velocity. Since the nominal interest rate is positive in all the scenarios that we consider,
(3.4) holds with strict equality.
11See Feenstra (1985) for a discussion of cash-in-advance constraints in continuous time models.
10The problem of the representative household is to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2) and
(3.4) by choice of time paths for cT
t , cN















t are the nontradable goods used in the process of distributing tradable goods.
Using this equation and consolidating the resource constraints of the government and the
household, we obtain the aggregate intertemporal resource constraint for tradable goods:

















3 . 1 .T h eE x c h a n g eR a t eC r i s i s
Prior to time zero, agents anticipate zero in￿ation and the economy is in a steady state with




t are constant over time. At time zero agents learn about the new
government transfers that make the ￿xed exchange rate regime unsustainable.
To characterize the time at which the ￿x e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec o l l a p s e sa n dt h ep o s t -
crisis behavior of the economy, we make particular assumptions about government policy.
Here there are two possibilities. First, we can specify a post-crisis monetary policy and a rule
for abandoning the ￿xed exchange rate. Second, we can specify a path for the exchange rate
and then reverse engineer a path for monetary policy that can support the exchange rate
path as an equilibrium. Computing this reverse mapping is diﬃcult in our context since we
have to ensure that the government￿s intertemporal budget constraint holds. For this reason
we followed the ￿rst strategy which has the additional advantage of preserving a tight link
with the large literature on currency crises.
Abandoning the Fixed Exchange Rate
We assume that the government ￿oats the currency at the ￿rst point in time, t∗,w h e n
n e td e b tr e a c h e ss o m e￿nite upper bound or, equivalently, when the domestic money supply
falls by χ percent of the initial money supply. We work with this rule for three reasons.
12In the Technical Appendix we describe the solution to a discrete time version of the household￿s problem
which limits to the solution of the continuous time problem as the interval between time periods goes to 0.
11First, it is a good description of what actually happens in a currency crisis. Second, it can
be interpreted as a short-run borrowing constraint on the government. Finally, Rebelo and
VØgh (2002) show that this rule can be optimal for an interesting class of economies.
Post-Crisis Monetary Policy
For simplicity we assume that the government will raise seigniorage revenues by a com-
bination of a one time increase in the stock of money at time T t oal e v e lMT and growth in
the money supply at rate ￿ from period T on. So the path of Mt is given by:
Mt = MTe
￿(t−T),f o rt ≥ T. (3.7)
Given T, the pair (MT,￿) must satisfy the government￿s budget constraint.
Computing the Time of the Speculative Attack
In order to solve for the time of the speculative attack, we must compute the dynamic
perfect foresight equilibrium. Our procedure is as follows. First, we ￿x the parameters of
monetary policy (χ, T, MT and ￿). Second, we derive the equilibrium paths of consump-
tion, in￿ation, and the exchange rate. Third, we check whether the government￿s budget
constraint is satis￿ed. If not, we adjust either MT or ￿ and recompute the equilibrium. We
repeat this procedure until we have converged upon a solution. Details of this procedure are
provided in the Technical Appendix. In computing the equilibrium we allow for discontinu-
ities in consumption, real balances, and government debt at the following points: (i) time
zero, when the new information arises; (ii) the time of the speculative attack (t∗); and (iii)
the time at which monetary policy changes (T).
4. Properties of the Model
In this section we discuss the properties of a version of our model calibrated to Korean data.
We do so with four objectives in mind. First, we ascertain whether this model can generate
low in￿ation rates in conjunction with high rates of depreciation. Second, we use the model
to study the implications of diﬀerent ￿nancing strategies for the government. Third, we
deconstruct the model to understand how it accounts for post-crisis in￿ation and exchange
rates. Finally, our analysis serves as a useful backdrop for our case study of Korea.
124.1. Calibration of the Model
Table 4 summarizes our assumptions about parameter values. We set σ =1 , so that utility
is logarithmic. We set r equal to 0.055.13 We normalize the initial exchange rate to S =1 .
Without loss of generality we set yT = yN =1 . This implies that the level of real GDP is
y =1+pN,w h e r epN = P N/S is the dollar price of nontradable goods.
Our data for Korea suggest that the share of tradable goods in GDP, sT, is roughly 0.35.14
Since the share of tradable goods in GDP is sT =1 /(1 + pN), pN must be equal to 1.86.
Between 1993 and 1997 government purchases averaged about 15.3 percent of GDP in
Korea. So we set g =0 .153y. We estimate that roughly 13.2 percent of government purchases
are tradable goods, implying gT =0 .132g and gN =( g − gT)/pN. We set initial transfers
to foreigners, v∗,e q u a lt o0. In the Technical Appendix we show that the steady state
value of net foreign assets, f0, the consumption of tradables, cT, and the consumption of
nontradables, cN, are uniquely pinned down given the values of yT, yN, gT, gN, v∗,a n dpN
that we have already chosen.
In the four years prior to Korea￿s crisis, the average ratio of the monetary base to GDP
was 0.067.W e s e t η so that the ratio of the monetary base to GDP in the initial steady
state is consistent with this value.15
Below we argue that the pre-crisis ratio of taxes to GDP in Korea was roughly 0.213.
Accordingly, we set τy =0 .213. The ratio of spending on transfers to GDP averaged 0.043
for the period 1993 to 1997. So we set steady state transfers, v,e q u a lt o0.043y.W ea s s u m e
that total transfers, vt,r e p r e s e n t4.3 percent of GDP in the steady state (v =0 .043y), which
corresponds to the average ratio of transfers to GDP from 1993 to 1997. The steady-state
value of CPI-indexed transfers (P￿ v/S) is set equal to 0.027y,o r2.7 percent of GDP. This
allows the model to generate an amount of revenue from the reduction in the dollar value of
transfers that is consistent with our empirical estimates for Korea presented in section 5.
To calibrate b0 we used data on the real consolidated foreign debt of the government
and central bank. The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (http://kiep.go.kr)
estimates that the foreign debt of the public sector in June 1997 was equal to 2 trillion won.
According to the International Financial Statistics (IFS), the value of the central bank￿s net
13Calibrating the dollar interest rate for Korea is diﬃcult because most internal lending is denominated
in won for regulatory reasons. We found that, across a wide variety of domestic instruments, the dollar rate
of return, while volatile, averaged between 5 and 6 percent in the period 1991 to 2002.
14This is the average share of agriculture, forestry, mining, and manufacturing in Korean GDP for 1993￿97.
15The value of η is given by η =0 .067y/[(1 + δpN)cT + pNcN].
13foreign assets was approximately 28 trillion won. This suggests that the net foreign assets
of the consolidated public sector was roughly equal to 26 trillion won or 5.7 percent of 1997
GDP. So we set b0 equal to −0.057y.
Nominal debt in the model (B) is a perpetuity, so its duration is diﬀerent from that of
Korea￿s debt. For this reason it is not appropriate to use the measured stock of nonindexed
debt on the eve of the crisis to calibrate B.W es e tB =0 .075y so that the revenue from debt
de￿ation is commensurate with our empirical estimates described in section 5. We choose
the level of lump sum taxes, τT, to ensure that the government￿s lifetime budget constraint,
(2.9), holds in the initial steady state of our model.16
We now turn to the parameters that govern post-crisis monetary policy. We identify
period zero as the end of June 1997, when the Thai banking crisis culminated in a currency
crisis. Like Thailand, Korea was undergoing a severe crisis in its banking industry. For our
purposes it seems reasonable to assume that the outbreak of the Thai crisis led Koreans to
anticipate that they too would undergo a currency crisis.17 This crisis occurred at the end of
October 1997, roughly 4 months after the Thai crisis. Given the diﬃculty of obtaining direct
evidence on the value of χ we set this parameter so that the speculative attack occurs four
months after time zero. We set the time at which there is a remonetization, T,t o0.5 (this
corresponds to the end of December 1997). To abstract from month-to-month variation in
the monetary base we set MT/M =1 .12. This value corresponds to the ratio of the average
monetary base in November 1997￿January 1998 to the average monetary base in May￿July
1997. Finally, we solve the model to endogenously determine the steady state money growth
rate, ￿, that is consistent with the government￿s intertemporal budget constraint.
According to Standard and Poor￿s (2000) the cost of the banking sector bailout was about
24 percent of 1997 GDP. In our case study of Korea below, we estimate that: (i) output
losses due to the recession induced losses of tax revenue amounting to 10.2 percent of GDP;
(ii) to date, explicit ￿scal reforms have equaled roughly 11.9 percent of GDP; and (iii) future
explicit ￿scal reforms will yield an additional 8.8 percent of GDP. Once we add these costs
to the bailout costs and net the ￿scal reforms from this total, the amount that needs to
be ￿nanced from depreciation-related revenue is about 13.5 percent of GDP. Hence we set
φ =0 .135y.
We set ω =0 .5 to match the weight that tradables receive in the Korean CPI. Nontradable
16Speci￿cally, τL is given by τL = r(b0 + B/S)+g + v − τy(yT + pNyN).
17See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001).
14goods aﬀect the predictions of the model only if there is a change in the dollar price of
nontradable goods after a crisis. Here we pursue a simple strategy to generate such a change:
consistent with the data, we assume that the domestic currency price of nontradables remains
constant for two months after the crisis and then starts growing at the rate of depreciation.18
In the presence of these nominal rigidities the market for nontradable goods does not clear￿
there is excess demand for nontradable goods. We make the simplifying assumption that
nontradables are rationed and there is no resale market for these goods. While admittedly
stark, this modeling strategy allows us to capture, in a parsimonious way, the eﬀects of a fall
in the price of nontradable goods without fully modeling the production side of the economy.
Finally, we set the distribution cost parameter δ to 0.5. This implies that the pre-crisis
distribution margin is 50 percent which is within the range of estimates presented in Burstein,
Neves, and Rebelo (2002).19
4.2. The Benchmark Model
Figure 1(a) depicts the equilibrium paths for the exchange rate, the CPI, the rate of deprecia-
tion, the rate of in￿ation, the level of the money supply, and real balances. Four key features
of Figure 1(a) are worth noting. First, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001), the
speculative attack happens after agents learn about de￿cits, but before new monetary policy
is implemented. So the attack is unpredictable on the basis of classical fundamentals such
as past de￿cits or in￿ation. Second, in￿ation rises in the wake of the exchange rate collapse,
well before the change in monetary policy. As in Sargent and Wallace (1981), this re￿ects
agents￿ anticipation of the increase in money supply that takes place at time T.T h i r d ,
there is a discrete drop in the money supply at the time of the attack. This re￿ects agents￿
decisions to exchange their domestic money holdings for dollars at the ￿xed exchange rate.
It is this drop in the money supply that triggers the threshold rule and leads the government
to abandon the ￿xed exchange rate regime. Fourth, there is a large wedge between the rate
18There are several mechanisms through which a fall in the dollar price of nontradables can occur. In
Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002) the dollar price of nontradables falls because of a drop in con-
sumption after a currency crisis that is induced by a tightening of agents￿ external borrowing constraints. In
their model agents reduce the production and consumption of nontradable goods and use the corresponding
resources to increase the production of exported goods. Because certain factors like capital are ￿xed in the
short run, the marginal (dollar) cost of producing nontradable goods is an increasing function of total output.
Other things equal, the fall in the production of nontradable goods induces a decline in their dollar price.
More generally, any negative wealth eﬀect associated with a currency crisis could generate similar eﬀects.
19The distribution margin is the fraction of the retail price that represents distribution costs. In our
notation this is given by: δPN
t /( ¯ PT
t + δPN
t ).
15of in￿ation and the rate of depreciation.
Table 5(a) summarizes the key implications of the model for in￿ation, depreciation, and
government ￿nancing in the wake of the crisis. A number of results are worth noting. First,
in￿ation in the ￿r s ty e a ra f t e rt h ec r i s i si so n l y12.7 percent, while long run in￿ation is only
2.0 percent. In￿a t i o ni nt h e￿rst year is higher than the 7.2 percent observed in the data.
However, Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002) argue that there was a signi￿cant down-
ward bias in measured Korean in￿ation.20 While it is diﬃcult to provide precise measures of
this bias, it is clear that taking it into account would move the model closer into conformity
with reality. Second, despite the low rate of in￿ation the rate of depreciation in the model
is 46.5 percent, more than three times higher than in￿ation in the ￿rst year after the crisis.
In terms of government ￿nancing seigniorage accounts for only 2.0 percent of pre-crisis
GDP, or less than 10 percent of total depreciation-related revenues. By far the most impor-
tant source of depreciation-related revenues is the fall in the dollar value of transfers (11.1
percent of pre-crisis GDP). This decline re￿ects the large wedge between the CPI and the
exchange rate that arises in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
Viewed overall our results imply that the government can satisfy most of its ￿nancing
needs by relying on an implicit ￿scal reform. We conclude that the model is consistent with
the observation that many large devaluations are associated with low rates of in￿ation and
that seigniorage plays a modest role in government ￿nancing.
4.3. Implications of Alternative Financing Scenarios
In this subsection we use the benchmark model to assess the implications of three alternative
￿nancing scenarios. First, suppose that there is no outstanding nominal debt at the onset
of the crisis (B =0 ) so that there are no revenues from debt de￿ation. In addition, assume
that the government makes up for this shortfall in revenue by increasing the steady state
growth rate of money. As Table 5 indicates, this alternative ￿nancing scenario implies a
modest rise in short-run in￿ation (from 12.7 to 16.4 percent) and to a twofold increase in
long run in￿ation (from 2to 6 percent).
20According to Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002) the bias in the oﬃcial ￿gures re￿ects the fact that,
after contractionary currency crises, consumers switch from high quality imports to lower quality domestic
substitutes. In principle this ￿￿ight from quality￿ should not aﬀect measured in￿ation since the CPI measures
the price of a ￿xed bundle of goods. However, in practice, the individual items that comprise the CPI basket
are replaced to re￿ect changes in consumption patterns. This can impart a signi￿cant downward bias in
measured in￿ation.
16Second, suppose that all transfers are indexed to the dollar. In this case the government
does not bene￿t from a reduction in the dollar value of transfers. As above, we assume that
the government makes up for this shortfall in revenue by raising the steady state growth rate
of money. Table 5 shows that this alternative ￿nancing scenario leads to markedly diﬀerent
implications for post-crisis in￿ation and exchange rates. Relative to the benchmark scenario
in￿ation in the ￿rst year after the crisis rises from 12.7 to 22.5 percent. Steady state in￿ation
rises from 2 to 12.7 percent. The rate of depreciation in the ￿rst year after the crisis climbs
from 46.5 to 60.3 percent.
Third, for completeness we eliminate revenues from both debt de￿ation and reductions
in the dollar value of transfers. Not surprisingly, under this scenario, in￿ation is very large
both in the ￿rst year after the crisis (29.2 percent) and in the long run (20.1). Moreover the
rate of exchange rate depreciation rises to almost 70 percent.
These experiments make clear that post-crisis rates of in￿ation and depreciation depend
critically on the sources of depreciation-related revenue available to a government. In this
sense the model is consistent with heterogeneity in post-crisis in￿ation and devaluation rates.
4.4. Deconstructing the Benchmark Model
In this subsection we use a sequence of numerical examples to document which features of
our model allow it to account for the post-crisis behavior of in￿ation, exchange rates and
seigniorage.
A Simple Textbook Model
We begin by eliminating all the features that distinguish our model from the simple
textbook setup. Speci￿cally, we assume that there is no local currency debt (B =0 ), all
goods are tradable (ω =1 ), prices are perfectly ￿exible, and there are no distribution costs
(δ =0 ). Given these assumptions PPP holds at the level of the CPI, so that the price level
coincides with the exchange rate. Also, the only depreciation-related source of revenue is
seigniorage.
Figure 1(b) depicts the equilibrium paths for the exchange rate, the CPI, the rate of
depreciation, the rate of in￿ation, the level of the money supply, and real balances. Table
5(e) summarizes the key implications of the model. A number of results are worth noting.
First, the rate of in￿a t i o ni nt h e￿rst year after the crisis is counterfactually large: 23.3
17percent. Second, the long run rate of in￿ation, 11.5 percent, is also counterfactually large.
Third, inconsistent with the data, the rate of in￿ation coincides with the rate of depreciation.
Introducing Nominal Debt
Table 5(f) displays the impact of incorporating nominal government debt into the simple
textbook model. In￿ation in the ￿rst year after the crisis falls from 23.3 percent in the
benchmark model to 19.6 percent. Long run in￿ation declines from 11.5 percent to 7.3
percent. Mirroring these results, seigniorage is now 9.1 percent of GDP, or about two-thirds
of total depreciation-related revenues. While this version of the model performs better
than the simple textbook model, it still suﬀers from important shortcomings: in￿ation is
counterfactually large and the rate of depreciation is too low relative to the data.
Introducing Nontradable Goods with Sticky Prices
We now incorporate nontradable goods into the previous model. As in our benchmark
analysis, we assume that the price of these goods is sticky. Table 5(g) summarizes the
properties of this version of the model. The key diﬀerence between this example and the
previous case is that the rates of depreciation and in￿ation are no longer the same. Now the
rate of depreciation in the ￿rst year after the crisis (34.2 percent) is much larger than the
rate of in￿ation during the same period (20.3 percent).
Introducing CPI-indexed Transfers
We now add, to the previous version of the model, government transfers that are in-
dexed to the CPI [see Table 5(h)]. The key impact of this change is that the importance
of seigniorage as a source of government ￿nance drops￿it now amounts to 6.2 percent of
pre-crisis GDP. Since seigniorage is less important, in￿ation declines to 16.4 percent in the
￿rst year after the crisis and to 5.4 percent in the new steady state. The problem is that the
rate of depreciation in the ￿rst year declines to only 29.7 percent.
Introducing Distribution Costs
Once we add distribution costs we are back to our benchmark model. Distribution costs
improve the performance of the model along two key dimensions. First, the model does a
m u c hb e t t e rj o bo fa c c o u n t i n gf o rt h ew e d g eb e t w e e nt h er a t eo fi n ￿ation and the rate of
depreciation. Second, seigniorage plays a much smaller role in government ￿nancing while
the fall in the dollar value of the transfers plays a large role.
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To summarize, introducing nonindexed debt and CPI-indexed transfers allows the model
to generate low in￿ation rates, especially in the steady state. This is because these sources
of revenue reduce the government￿s need to rely on seigniorage revenues. Introducing non-
tradable goods and distribution costs allows the model to generate large devaluations along
with low rates of in￿ation. In combination these features allow the model to account for the
salient features of data on post-crisis seigniorage, in￿ation and devaluation rates.
5. Case Studies: Korea, Mexico, and Turkey
We now turn to three case studies to assess how governments actually ￿nanced the ￿scal
costs associated with currency crises. We use these results to assess the plausibility of our
model￿s predictions for post-crisis rates of in￿ation and depreciation.
In our theoretical analysis, the government ￿nances crisis costs via a combination of: (i)
seigniorage revenues; (ii) debt de￿ation; (iii) reductions in the dollar value of government
transfers; and (iv) reductions in the dollar value of the government￿s purchases net of tax
revenue. In reality two other factors come into play: (v) explicit ￿scal reforms that raise
tax revenue or reduce spending; and (vi) revenue losses associated with post-crisis declines
in real activity.
It is diﬃcult to precisely quantify the importance of (i)-(vi). The basic problem is that
one must compare actual revenues and expenditures with what they would have been absent
the crisis. Inevitably, this requires relying on debatable assumptions about how economic
aggregates would have evolved if a crisis had not occurred. In practice we found that the
breakdown of ￿scal reforms between explicit and implicit reforms is particularly sensitive to
these assumptions. Even seigniorage calculations can be sensitive to the assumptions made
about what money growth and depreciation rates would have been in the absence of a crisis.
Nevertheless we think that our calculations are informative.
Before we turn to the details of our calculations we brie￿ys u m m a r i z et h em a i n￿ndings
for the three countries that we study: Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. First, none of these
countries have fully paid for all the costs associated with their currency crises. According
to our estimates, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey have paid for roughly 43, 52 and 54 percent
of the costs of their crises, respectively. Second, to date, in none of these countries has
seigniorage been the dominant source of revenues. Its importance has varied from 7 percent
19of net crisis costs in the case of Mexico to roughly 10 percent in the case of Turkey. Third,
debt de￿ation has been more important than seigniorage in all three countries, ranging from
al o wo f7.2 percent of the total cost in Mexico to a high of 38 percent of the total cost in
Turkey. Fourth, in all cases there was a substantial decline in the dollar value of tax revenues
after the crisis. but the decline in the dollar value of government purchases was important
in oﬀsetting the tax revenue decline. Finally, our estimates suggest that there were large
declines in the dollar value of transfers. Indeed, in the case of Korea and Mexico this was
the single most important source of revenue.
We now take to the details of our analysis and discuss our assumptions and procedures
with reference to the Korean case. We then turn to the Mexican and Turkish episodes.
5.1. Case Study of Korea
Timing and Interest Rates We denote the month and year in which the crisis occurred
by tm and ta, respectively. For the Korean case we set tm to October 1997 and ta to 1997.
We make this distinction because some data is available at the monthly frequency (e.g.
seigniorage revenue) while other data (e.g. government purchases of goods and services) is
available only at an annual frequency.
To simplify, we assume a constant annual dollar interest rate, r, equal to an estimate of
the average dollar interest rate for government debt. Consistent with our discussion above
we set r =0 .055 in the Korean case.
Seigniorage Revenue Recall that in our model the government cannot raise seigniorage
revenue under a ￿xed exchange rate regime because the demand for real and nominal balances
is constant. In reality governments can raise seigniorage revenues under a ￿xed exchange
rate since the demand for real balances grows if output expands.
We measure actual seigniorage revenue, Mt − Mt−1, using data on the monetary base,
Mt. The dollar value of seigniorage revenue, (Mt−Mt−1)/St, is computed using the monthly
average exchange rate. We assume that, in the absence of a crisis, the money stock would
have grown at a constant rate ￿m, so that the monetary base would have been expected to
be Me
t = Mtm(1 + ￿m)t−tm. Hypothetical seigniorage revenue is given by Me
t − Me
t−1.W e
convert these ￿ows to dollars using a forecast of what the monthly exchange rate would have
been in the absence of the crisis, Se
t.W ea s s u m et h a tSe
t = Stm(1 + δm)t−tm,w h e r eδm is set
equal to a forecast of what the average depreciation rate of the currency would have been in
20the absence of the crisis.21 The increase in the present value of seigniorage revenue is given
by:
















Here Tm denotes the last period for which we have monthly data on the monetary base and
the exchange rate, i.e., August 2002.
In the Korean case we set ￿m =0 .0005, which corresponds to the average monthly
money growth rate for the period October 1993 through October 1997. In addition we set
δm =0 .0008, which corresponds to the average monthly depreciation rate of the won between
1980 and 1997.22
Given our assumptions, the increase in Korean seigniorage revenue between November
1997 (tm +1 ) and August 2002 (Tm)w a s8.1 billion dollars, or 1.7 percent of Korea￿s GDP
in 1997.
Debt Deﬂation To estimate the revenue from debt de￿ation we must measure the change
in the dollar value of outstanding domestic debt as a result of the crisis. This requires data
on the maturity structure of debt. Table 6 summarizes the value of the diﬀerent bonds
outstanding in Korea at the end of October 1997, along with information on maturities.
We do not have detailed data on the maturity of each bond. For bonds with multiple
maturities we assume that there were equal quantities of each maturity outstanding in Oc-
tober 1997.23 Within each maturity we assume that the number of bonds within 1 month of
their maturity date is the same as the number of bonds within 2 months, 3 months, etc., of
their maturity dates.24
Given these assumptions, we construct a schedule of debt payments on Korean domestic
21Many countries that experience currency crises do not literally have ￿xed exchange rates. So, for these
countries, we must estimate a rate of depreciation that would have been consistent with the prior exchange
rate regime.
22This assumption implies that in the absence of the crisis the dollar would have been worth about 1003
won at the end of 2001, compared to its actual value of 1314 won and its value of 844 won at the end of
1996.
23For example, within ￿Grain Securities￿ we assume that roughly 1.62 trillion won worth of the outstanding
bonds were of 1 year, 3 year, and 5 year maturity, implying a total of 4.87 trillion won.
24For example, for 1 year ￿Grain Securities￿ we assume that there were bonds worth roughly 0.135 trillion
won that were 1 month, 2 months, ..., 12 months from their maturity date at the end of October 1997. All
bonds are treated as zero coupon bonds.


























Here Bt denotes the debt payment to be made in month t.T h e v a r i a b l e Tb denotes the
period when all the outstanding debt will be paid oﬀ. The last term in the previous formula
re￿ects revenue from debt de￿ation associated with debt maturing after Ts, which is equal
to November 2002, the last date for which we have data on St.
According to our data, the total value of outstanding Korean domestic debt at the end
of October 1997 was roughly 73.9 trillion won, or 16.3 percent of 1997 GDP. Our estimates
imply that revenue from debt de￿ation was about 16.6 billion dollars or 3.5 percent of GDP.
Figure 2 illustrates the time series of Korea￿s revenue from debt de￿ation from 1997 through
2001. Note that most of the revenue from debt de￿ation accrued in the ￿rst few months
after the crisis. This fact suggests that our calculations are not very sensitive to either the
precise maturity structure of the debt or the fact that our data ends before all the domestic
debt has been redeemed.
Changes in Tax Revenues To measure the change in taxes due to the crisis, we compute
the diﬀerence between actual tax revenues, Tt, and what taxes would have been in the absence
of the crisis, T e
t . We assume that actual dollar tax revenue is given by Tt = T L
t +τptYt,w h e r e
T L
t denotes lump sum taxes, Yt is real GDP, pt = Pt/St,a n dPt is the GDP de￿ator.25 The
presence of lump-sum taxes allows us to capture, in a simple way, the fact that tax revenues
are not perfectly correlated with GDP. We assume that, up to an i.i.d. error, lump-sum
taxes are proportional to trend GDP, i.e., T L
t =( τL +†L
t )ﬂ ptﬂ Yt,w h e r eﬂ pt and ﬂ Yt are the ￿tted
values from log-linear trends ￿tt opt and Yt over the period 1980￿97.
We assume that in the absence of the crisis, tax revenue would have been expected to be
T e
t =( τL + τ)pe
tY e
t .H e r epe
t and Y e
t denote the pre-crisis expected values of pt and Yt.F o r
Korea we set pe
t and Y e
t equal to the projections implied by log-linear trends ￿tt opt and Yt
over the period 1980￿97. These projections are illustrated in Figures 3(a) and 3(b).








25Notice that ptYt is GDP measured in current dollars.
22Here Ta denotes the last period for which we have annual ￿scal data, 2001.
To compute ∆(T) we need estimates of τL and τ. Assuming that †L
t is uncorrelated
with (ptYt)/(ﬂ ptﬂ Yt), we can estimate τL and τ by regressing Tt/(ﬂ ptﬂ Yt)on a constant and
(ptYt)/(ﬂ ptﬂ Yt). Doing so over the period 1980-97 yields τL =0 .047and τ =0 .166.
Next, we decompose ∆(T) into three components: (i) an output eﬀect; (ii) a relative
price eﬀect; and (iii) a residual eﬀect that we ascribe to explicit ￿scal reform. We de￿ne the










Note that in this expression changes in tax revenue are due solely to the eﬀect of the crisis








This expression isolates the impact on tax revenue of changes in pt associated with the crisis.
The residual component, or explicit ￿scal reform, is given by:
∆(T,e)=∆(T) − ∆(T,Y) − ∆(T,p).
Figure 4(a) illustrates the actual path of government revenue in Korea along with the
projected path implied by our calculations. Consistent with conventional wisdom, we ￿nd
that the crisis led to a large decline in the dollar value of tax revenues, both because of
the output eﬀe c ta n dt h er e l a t i v ep r i c ee ﬀect. Speci￿cally, we estimate that through 2001
Korean tax revenues fell by 192.5 billion dollars as a result of the crisis. Of this total, 48.7
billion dollars were due to output losses and 174.0 billion dollars were due to the change
in relative prices. These two eﬀects were oﬀset by explicit revenue increases amounting to
about 30.1 billion dollars.
Changes in Government Purchases of Goods and Services Let Gt denote the dollar
value of the actual ￿ow of government purchases of goods and services. We assume that in




t . Here, g represents a trend share of government purchases to GDP. The








23For Korea, we set g =0 .153 which corresponds to the ratio of government purchases to GDP
in the period 1993￿97.
We decompose the change in government purchases into two components: (i) a relative
price eﬀect; and (ii) a residual eﬀect that we ascribe to explicit ￿scal reform. The change in












t /St and P G
t is the de￿ator for government purchases from the national income
accounts.26 Note that this expression isolates the changes in government purchases that
are due to movements in relative prices. The residual component, or explicit change in
government purchases, is:
∆(G,e)=∆(G) − ∆(G,p).
Figure 4(c) illustrates the actual path of government purchases in Korea along with the
projected path implied by our calculations. We estimate that through 2001 the Korean
government saved 191.6 billion dollars on its purchases as a result of the crisis. Of this total,
159.2 billion dollars were due to the change in relative prices, while 32.4 billion dollars were
due to explicit cuts in spending.
These calculations demonstrate the quantitative importance of the fall in the relative
price of nontradables on the government￿s ￿scal position. In the Korean case this eﬀect goes
al o n gw a yi no ﬀsetting the impact of the crisis on tax revenues emphasized in the literature.
Focusing on the tax eﬀects while ignoring the expenditure eﬀects greatly overstates the
adverse eﬀect of the crisis on the government￿s ￿scal position.
C h a n g e si nS p e n d i n go nT r a n s f e r s Let vt be actual spending on transfers measured
in dollar terms. Recall that in the model we assumed that some transfers are explicitly
denominated in dollars while others are explicitly denominated in local currency. Here we
assume that total transfer spending (measured in dollar terms) is given by:
vt =
￿
















where ﬂ Pt and ﬂ St are the ￿tted values from log-linear trends ￿tt oPt and St over the period
1980￿97. Recall that ﬂ pt is the log-linear trend for pt. W ea s s u m et h a tvt is proportional
26We rescale PG
t so that it is equal to Pt in the year prior to the crisis.
24to trend real GDP to capture the fact that transfers are not very cyclically sensitive in
industrializing countries. Our speci￿cation also captures a key feature of our theoretical
model: some transfers are sensitive to changes in relative prices, while others are not. Since
we do not have any data that distinguishes between these two types of transfers, we use the
following procedure to estimate ψand ﬂ ψ.W ea s s u m et h a t†v
t is uncorrelated with ﬂ St/St and
estimate ﬂ ψ and ψ by regressing vt/(ﬂ ptﬂ Yt) on a constant and ﬂ St/St. Using Korean data for
the period 1980￿97 we obtained ψ =0 .0415and ﬂ ψ =0 .0007.
We assume that, in the absence of the crisis, expected total transfers (measured in dollars)
are ve
t =(ﬂ ψ + ψ)pe
tY e








We decompose ∆(v) into two components: (i) a relative price eﬀect; and (ii) a residual
eﬀect that we ascribe to explicit ￿scal reform. We de￿ne the change in transfers due to













t is set equal to the projection implied by a log-linear trend ￿tt oSt over the period
1980￿97. This projection and the implied projection P e
t = pe
tSe
t are illustrated in Figures
3(c) and 3(d).
The residual component, or explicit change in transfers, is:
∆(v,e)=∆(v) − ∆(v,p).
Figure 4(e) illustrates the actual path of government transfers in Korea, along with
the trend path implied by our calculations. We estimate that through 2001, the Korean
government saved 30.0 billion dollars on its transfers as a result of the crisis, most of which
(35.6 billion dollars) was due to the change in relative prices.
Korea Case Study: Summary In summary, our results for Korea are as follows. The
￿scal cost of the banking sector bailout was approximately 114.4 billion dollars or 24.0 percent
of Korea￿s GDP in 1997. Lost revenue due to the post-crisis recession was roughly 48.7 billion
dollars or 10.2 percent of GDP. Explicit ￿scal reforms amounted to 56.9 billion dollars or
2511.9 percent of GDP. Taken together these results imply that the Korean government had
to raise 106.1 billion dollars or 22.3 percent of GDP, to pay for the remaining ￿scal costs.
Table 7 summarizes our estimate of how much has been ￿nanced until now. To date the
government has raised 42.9 billion dollars (9.6 p e r c e n to fG D P )o ft h ec o s t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t h
the crisis. Most of these resources were raised through a substantial decline in the dollar value
of transfers amounting to 7.5 percent of GDP. Oﬀsetting this was the decline in government
revenue net of government purchases of goods and services, which amounted to −3.1 percent
of GDP. Because the Korean government had only modest amounts of won-denominated
debt, only 3.5 p e r c e n to fG D Pw a sr a i s e db yd e ￿ating its dollar value. Additional seigniorage
contributed only 1.7 percent of GDP in new revenue. So total depreciation-related revenue
so far adds up to about 9.6 percent of GDP. Given our estimates, the government must
still pay for 57.1 percent of the ￿scal cost, or 12.7 percent of pre-crisis GDP. Our model
can account for the large depreciation and modest post-crisis in￿ation rates in Korea under
t h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tm u c ho ft h er e m a i n i n g￿scal cost of the crisis will be ￿nanced through
future explicit ￿scal reforms, and implicit declines in the dollar value of transfers.
We conclude by emphasizing that, in both the data and our model, seigniorage, the source
of ￿nancing most emphasized in the literature, plays a relatively minor role. In reality the
two most important sources of ￿nancing are large reductions in both the dollar value of
government purchases and transfer payments.
5.2. Case study: Mexico
Timing and Interest Rates For Mexico the month and year in which the crisis occurred,
tm and ta, are given by November 1994 and 1994, respectively. So we measure seigniorage and
debt de￿ation beginning with December 1994, and changes in government revenue, purchases,
and transfers beginning in 1995. We set the annual dollar interest rate to r =0 .109.T h i s
corresponds to the average EMBI (Mexico) dollar spread plus the US 3-month T-bill rate
between December 1994 and January 2003.
Seigniorage Revenue We measured actual seigniorage revenue (Mt−Mt−1)/St using the
same method as in the Korean case. As above we assumed that, in the absence of a crisis,
the money stock would have been Me
t = Mtm(1+￿m)t−tm and the exchange rate would have
been Se
t = Stm(1 + δm)t−tm.W e s e t ￿m =0 .0114 and δm =0 .003, which are the average
monthly rates of money growth and depreciation between June 1991 and June 1994. The
26last period for which we have monthly money stock data for Mexico (Tm) is November 2002.
According to our estimates, the increase in the Mexican government￿s seigniorage revenue
between December 1994 (tm +1 ) and November 2002 (Tm)w a s6.7 billion dollars, or 1.7
percent of Mexico￿s GDP in 1994.
Debt Deﬂation Our data on Mexico￿s outstanding domestic debt is summarized in Table
6, which indicates the quantities of two types of bonds outstanding (net of central bank
holdings) at the end of November 1994 along with information on their maturities. Cetes
are peso denominated bonds similar to T-bills and Ajustabonos are bonds indexed to the
CPI. Mexico also issued domestic securities called Tesabonos and Bondes prior to the crisis.
However, Tesabonos were indexed to the dollar and Bondes had adjustable interest rates.
For this reason we ignore these securities in our calculations. For each type of bond, we
assume that equal quantities of each maturity were outstanding in November 1994. As for
Korea, within each maturity we assume that there are equal numbers of bonds within 1
month of their maturity date as there are within 2 months, 3 months, etc., of their maturity
date. We also treat all bonds as if they were zero coupon bonds.
All Cetes and Ajustabonos outstanding at the end of November 1994 would have been






































t represents the number of Ajustabonos maturing at date t, Pt represents the CPI,
and P e
t = Ptm(1+πm)t−tm is an estimate of what the CPI would have been in the absence of
the crisis. We set πm =0 .0086, the average monthly CPI in￿ation rate between June 1991
and June 1994.
For Mexico, the total value of all outstanding Cetes and Ajustabonos at the end of
November 1994 was roughly 71.7 billion pesos, or 5.1 percent of 1994 GDP. We estimate
that revenue from debt de￿ation was about 6.9 billion dollars or 1.7 percent of GDP. Figure
5 illustrates the time series of Mexico￿s revenue from debt de￿ation from 1994 through 1999.
27As in the Korean case, much of the revenue from debt de￿ation accrued in the ￿rst six
months after the crisis.
Changes in Tax Revenues To measure the change in taxes due to the crisis, we use the
same method as in the Korean case. Our Mexican data set spans the period 1980￿2002.
Over this period, the Mexican economy experienced substantially more volatility than the
Korean economy. For this reason, we used Hodrick-Prescott trends rather than simple linear
trends to construct the ﬂ pt and ﬂ Yt series used in the estimation of τL. Using data for the
period 1980￿2002 we estimate τL =0 .015.W ec h o s eτ =0 .213 so that the implied ratio of
taxes to GDP along the trend path would be equal to 0.228, the ratio of taxes to GDP in
1994.27
To project tax revenue beyond the crisis we set T e
t =( τL + τ)pe
tY e
t . We computed the
projections pe
t and Y e
t by assuming that pt and Yt were expected to increase by 6.6 and 3.3
percent per year, respectively, from their 1994 values. These growth rates correspond to the
average growth rates of pt and Yt in the period 1991￿94. These projections are illustrated
in Figures 6(a) and 6(b). Given the values of τL and τ,a n dt h es e r i e sTt, pt,a n dYt,w e
compute the change in tax revenue due to the crisis￿and its decomposition into output,
relative price, and explicit reform components￿as we did for Korea.
Figure 7(a) illustrates the actual path of government revenue in Mexico along with the
trend path implied by our calculations. We estimate that through 2001 Mexican tax revenues
fell by 216.3 billion dollars as a result of the crisis. Of this total, 25.9 billion dollars were
due to output losses and 159.8 billion dollars were due to the change in relative prices.
In addition, we estimate that there were explicit tax cuts amounting to about 30.5 billion
dollars.
Changes in Government Purchases of Goods and Services We set the trend share of
government purchases to GDP, g, equal to the ratio of government purchases to GDP in 1994,
0.143. We then decomposed the change in government purchases into a relative price eﬀect
and explicit ￿scal reform using the same method as for Korea. Figure 7(c) illustrates the
actual path of government purchases in Mexico along with the projected path, Ge
t, implied
by our calculations. We estimate that through 2001 the Mexican government saved 173.8
27If we estimate τ with the same procedure used to estimate τL,w e￿nd τ =0 .231. This value of τ,a l o n g
with our estimate of τL ,implies a ratio of taxes to GDP along the trend path equal to 0.246 . This ratio is
considerably higher than the actual ratio of taxes to GDP in the years 1991￿94.
28billion dollars on its purchases as a result of the crisis. Of this total, 102.4 billion dollars
were due to the change in relative prices, while 71.3 billion dollars were due to explicit cuts
in spending.
Changes in Spending on Transfers For Se
t,w ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t ew a s
projected to rise at 3.8 percent per year, which was the peso￿s average depreciation rate in
the period 1991￿94. The path for Se
t and the implied path for Pe




d i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e s6 ( c )a n d6 ( d ) .
Our estimate of ﬂ ψ, obtained using data for the period 1980￿2002, is 0.003.T h ev a l u eo f
ψ was chosen so that the trend value of transfers to GDP coincides with the actual value
of the ratio of transfers to GDP in 1994 (6.2 percent). This yields a value of ψ equal to
0.0614. Figure 7(e) illustrates the actual path of government transfers in Mexico along with
the trend path implied by our calculations.
We estimate that through 2001 the Mexican government saved 43.2 billion dollars on its
transfers as a result of the crisis through a combination of 93.9 billion dollars due to changes
in relative prices and explicit ￿scal reforms of −50.8 billion dollars (i.e., there were explicit
increases in transfers in Mexico).
Mexico Case Study: Summary In summary, our results for Mexico are as follows. The
￿scal cost of the banking sector bailout was approximately 60.1 billion dollars or 15.0 percent
of Mexico￿s GDP in 1994. Lost revenue due to the post-crisis recession was roughly 25.9
billion dollars or 6.5 percent of GDP. Explicit ￿scal reforms amounted to −10.0 billion dollars
or −2.5 percent of GDP. Taken together these results imply that the Mexican government
had to raise 96.0 billion dollars, or 23.9 percent of GDP, of depreciation-related revenues.
To date, the government has raised 52.2 percent (12.5 p e r c e n to fG D P )o ft h ec o s t s
associated with the crisis, as summarized in Table 7. Most of these resources were raised
through a substantial decline in the dollar value of transfers amounting to 23.4 percent
of GDP, but these were oﬀset by a substantial decline in the dollar value of government
revenue net of government purchases of goods and services: −14.3 percent of GDP. Because
the Mexican government had only modest amounts of peso-denominated debt, only 1.7
percent of GDP was raised by de￿ating its dollar value. Additional seigniorage contributed
1.7 percent of GDP in new revenue. Given our estimates, the government must still pay for
the remaining 47.8 percent of the ￿scal costs (11.4 percent of pre-crisis GDP).
29Absent any indication of large impending ￿scal reforms, it seems reasonable to suppose
that much of the remainder of the ￿scal costs will be paid for with seigniorage revenues.
We estimate that if, from November 2002 on, the monetary base grew at the same monthly
rate as under the counterfactual, ￿m =0 .0114, and the peso depreciated at the same rate as
under the counterfactual, the government would raise 12.5 percent of pre-crisis GDP from
additional seigniorage. This would be slightly more revenue than the government would need
to fully ￿nance the remaining costs associated with the crisis. Of course, if Mexico prints
money more quickly or the peso depreciates less slowly than under our assumptions, then
the government will be able to cover the ￿scal costs of the crisis more quickly.
The key point is that, absent any sign of explicit ￿scal reforms, it seems quite likely
that the bulk of the costs will be covered via explicit seigniorage revenues. Our model would
predict that with this much ￿nancing coming from seigniorage, the rate of in￿ation in Mexico
would be considerably higher than it would have been had the implicit ￿scal reforms or the
initial domestic debt been larger.
5.3. Case study: Turkey
Timing and Interest Rates For Turkey, the month and year prior to the occurrence
of the crisis, tm and ta, are given by January 2001 and 2000, respectively. So we measure
seigniorage and debt de￿ation beginning with February 2001 and changes in government
revenue, purchases, and transfers beginning in 2001. We set the annual dollar interest rate
to r =0 .1066. This corresponds to the average EMBI+ (Turkey) dollar spread plus the US
3-month T-bill rate between February 2001 and January 2003.28
Seigniorage Revenue We measured actual seigniorage revenue (Mt−Mt−1)/St using the
same method as in the Korean case. As above we assumed that, in the absence of a crisis,
the money stock would have been Me
t = Mtm(1+￿m)t−tm and the exchange rate would have
been Se
t = Stm(1 + δm)t−tm.W e s e t ￿m =0 .0238 and δm =0 .0175, which are the average
monthly rates of money growth and depreciation between January 2000 and January 2001.
The last period for which we have monthly money stock data for Turkey (Tm)i sO c t o b e r
2002.
According to our estimates, the increase in the Turkish government￿s seigniorage revenue
28Between the inception of the EMBI+ for Turkey in August 1999 and the end of January 2001 this rate
averaged 10.63 percent.
30between February 2001 (tm+1)a n dO c t o b e r2 0 0 2( Tm) was 3.7 billion dollars, or 1.8 percent
of Turkey￿s GDP in 2000.
Debt Deﬂation Table 6 summarizes our data on Turkey￿s outstanding securitized do-
mestic debt. This table indicates the quantities and maturity of diﬀerent types of bonds
outstanding at the end of January 2001. Turkey had only very small amounts of indexed
domestic debt, from which we abstract.
We assume that for each type of bond there were equal quantities outstanding in each
month beginning in February 2001 and ending at the month corresponding to twice the
average maturity date given in Table 6. We treat all bonds as if they were zero coupon
bonds.
We use the same expression for debt de￿ation that we used for Korea. In this case, all
government debt outstanding at the end of January 2001 should be paid back by Tb = April
2009. The last date for which we have data on St, denoted Ts, is equal to December 2002.
For Turkey, the total value of all domestic debt not held by the public sector at the end
of January 2001 was roughly 35.5 quadrillion Turkish lire, or 28.5 percent of 2000 GDP.
We estimate that revenue from debt de￿ation was about 14.6 billion dollars or 7.3 percent
of GDP. Figure 8 illustrates the time series of Turkey￿s revenue from debt de￿ation from
2001 projected out to 2009. As in the Korean and Mexican cases, much of the revenue from
debt de￿ation accrued in the ￿rst year after the crisis. Notice, however, that the amount of
revenue raised by debt de￿a t i o ni sm u c hl a r g e ri nt h eT u r k i s hc a s e .
Changes in Tax Revenues To project tax revenue beyond the crisis we used a simpler
model than for Korea and Mexico. We set T e
t = τpe
tY e
t and set τ =0 .271,t h er a t i oo ft a x e s
to GDP in 2000. Since pt had been relatively stable in Turkey for many years we assume
that agents expected it to remain constant at its value in 2000. We set the annual growth
rate of Y e
t to 3.7 percent. This corresponds to the average growth rate of Yt in the period
1987￿2000. These projections are illustrated in Figures 9(a) and 9(b). Given the value of τ
and the series Tt, pt,a n dYt, we compute the change in tax revenue due to the crisis and its
decomposition into output, relative price, and explicit components as we did for Korea.
Figure 10(a) illustrates the actual path of government revenue in Turkey along with the
trend path implied by our calculations. We estimate that through 2002 Turkish tax revenues
fell by 19.3 billion dollars as a result of the crisis. Of this total, 8.7 billion dollars were due
31to output losses and 14.2 billion dollars were due to the change in relative prices. In addition
we estimate that there were explicit tax increases amounting to about 3.6 billion dollars.
Changes in Government Purchases of Goods and Services We set the trend share of
government purchases to GDP, g,e q u a lt o0.201, which is the ratio of government purchases
to GDP in 2000. We then decomposed the change in government purchases into a relative
price eﬀect and explicit ￿scal reform using the same method as for Korea. Figure 10(c)
illustrates the actual path of government purchases in Turkey along with the projected path,
Ge
t, implied by our calculations. We estimate that through 2002 the Turkish government
saved 15.3 billion dollars on its purchases as a result of the crisis. Of this total, 6.0 billion
dollars were due to the change in relative prices, while 9.3 billion dollars were due to explicit
cuts in spending.
Changes in Spending on Transfers For Se
t,w ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t ew a s
projected to rise at 21.2 percent per year, which was the Turkish Lira￿s depreciation rate
in the period January 2000￿January 2001. The path for Se





t)a r ed i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e s9 ( c )a n d9 ( d ) .
We set ﬂ ψ =0and ψ =0 .074 so that the trend value of transfers to GDP coincides with
the actual value of the ratio of transfers to GDP in 2000 (7.4 percent). Figure 10(e) illustrates
the actual path of government transfers in Turkey along with the trend path implied by our
calculations.
We estimate that, through 2002, the Turkish government enacted explicit increases in
transfers worth 6.3 billion dollars. At the same time, the government bene￿ted from an
automatic reduction in the dollar value of transfers due to changes in relative prices worth
10.5 billion dollars. The net result was a reduction in the value of transfers of 4.3 billion
dollars.
Turkey Case Study: Summary In summary, our results for Turkey are as follows. The
￿scal cost of the banking sector bailout was approximately 36.2 billion dollars or 18.2 percent
of Turkey￿s GDP in 2000. Lost revenue due to the post-crisis recession was roughly 8.7 billion
dollars or 4.4 percent of GDP. Explicit ￿scal reforms amounted to 6.7 billion dollars or 3.3
percent of GDP. Taken together these results imply that the Turkish government had to
raise 38.3 billion dollars, or 19.2 percent of GDP, of depreciation-related revenues.
32To date we estimate that the government has raised 53.8 percent (10.3 p e r c e n to fG D P )o f
the costs associated with the crisis, as summarized in Table 7. Most of these resources were
raised through a substantial decline in the dollar value of Turkey￿s domestic debt amounting
to 7.3 percent of GDP and through increased seigniorage revenues (1.8 percent of GDP).
The dollar value of transfers declined by 5.3 percent of GDP, but these were oﬀset by a
decline in the dollar value of government revenue net of government purchases of goods and
services of −4.1 percent of GDP. Based on this evidence we conclude that the Turkish case
is quite diﬀerent than the Korean and Mexican cases. First, while all three countries have so
far ￿nanced about 50 percent of the net ￿scal costs associated with their crises, Turkey has
done so much more quickly (2 years for Turkey versus 5 and 8, respectively for Korea and
Mexico). Second, the Turkish government has relied much more on seigniorage and debt
de￿ation, while the Korean and Mexican governments have relied more on implicit ￿scal
reform.
6. Conclusion
This paper explored the implications of diﬀerent strategies for ￿nancing the ￿scal costs
associated with a currency crisis for in￿ation and depreciation rates. We argue that models
based on the assumption that seigniorage is the only depreciation-related source of revenue
lead to misleading predictions about post-crisis rates of in￿ation and depreciation. We then
show that models that incorporate an empirically plausible menu of depreciation-related
revenues can account for the high depreciation rates and low in￿ation rates that are often
observed in the aftermath of currency crises.
Our case studies indicate that diﬀerent governments pursue diﬀerent ￿nancing strate-
gies. For example, debt de￿a t i o np l a y e dam o r ei m p o r t a n tr o l ei nT u r k e yt h a ni nK o r e ao r
Mexico. In contrast, the reduction in the dollar value transfers played a very large role in
Mexico. This paper is silent on why these governments chose diﬀerent strategies. In our
view, understanding the political economy considerations that underlie these choices is an
important topic for future research.
33TABLE 1
Seigniorage












∗Estimate based on data through Oct. 2002.
34TABLE 2









Korea Sep. 97￿Sep. 98 50.9 6.9
￿Sep. 99 31.8 7.7
Thailand June 97￿June 98 67.1 15.5
￿June 99 45.4 14.2
Philippines June 97￿June 98 54.2 17.0
￿June 99 44.7 23.7
Mexico Nov. 94￿Nov. 95 94.8 47.2
￿Nov. 96 101.5 88.0
Brazil Dec. 98￿Dec. 99 52.9 8.9
￿Dec. 00 62.9 15.5
Turkey Jan. 01￿Jan. 02 103.2 73.2
￿Dec. 02 144.3 118.8
Notes: The rate of depreciation is calculated as 100(St+j/St − 1),w h e r eSt is the monthly
average exchange rate.
35TABLE 3






Korea Sep. 97￿Sep. 98 −30.3
Thailand June 97￿June 98 −33.2
Philippines June 97￿June 98 −27.7
Mexico Nov. 94￿Nov. 95 −38.4
Brazil Dec. 98￿Dec. 99 −30.0




σ =1 inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ω =0 .5 share of tradables in CPI
r =0 .055 real interest rate
S =1 initial exchange rate
yT =1 output of tradables
yN =1 output of nontradables
pN =1 .86 initial relative price of nontradables
y = yT + pNyN =2 .86 initial GDP (in dollars)
g =0 .153y initial government purchases (in dollars)
gT =0 .132g initial government purchases of tradables
gN =( g − gT)/pN initial government purchases of nontradables
v =0 .043y initial total transfers (in dollars)
v∗ =0 initial transfers to foreigners (in dollars)
P￿ v/S =0 .027y initial CPI-indexed transfers (in dollars)
(M/S)/y =0 .067 initial ratio of base money to GDP
τT = τN =0 .213 tax rates on tradable and nontradable goods
b0 = −0.057y initial government dollar debt level
B =0 .075y government nominal debt
φ =0 .135 amount ￿nanced by devaluation-based revenues
t∗ =0 .33 time of the speculative attack
T =0 .5 time of switch to new monetary policy
MT/M =1 .12 ratio of base money at time T to initial base money
δ =0 .5 distribution cost of tradables
(b) Without nominal debt: same as (a) except B =0
(c) Without CPI-indexed transfers: same as (a) except ￿ v =0
(d) Without nominal debt and CPI-indexed transfers: same as (a) except B =￿ v =0
(e) Basic textbook model: same as (a) except ω =1 , yN = gN =￿ v = B = δ =0 ,
y = yT, gT = g, pN and τN unde￿ned.
(f) ... adding nominal debt: same as (e) except B =0 .075y
(g) ... adding nontraded goods with sticky prices: same as (a) except δ =0and ￿ v =0
(h) ... adding CPI-indexed transfers: same as (a) except δ =0
Note: The alternative models are described in the text. The letters and cases correspond to
those in Table 5.
37TABLE 5
Korea Calibration, Numerical Results
In￿ation Deprec. Financing (pe
Yr 1 Long-run Yr 1 Seig. Nominal
Debt
De￿ation
a) Benchmark model 12.72 .04 6 .52 .03 .6
Alternative Financing Scenarios
b) Benchmark without nominal debt 16.46 .05 1 .75 .50
c) Benchmark without CPI-indexed transfers 22.51 2 .76 0 .31 1 .05 .7
d) Benchmark without both 29.22 0 .16 9 .91 6 .70
Deconstructing the Model
e) Simple textbook model 23.31 1 .52 3 .31 3 .50
f) Textbook model adding nominal debt 19.67 .31 9 .69 .14 .4
g) Case (f) adding nontraded goods with sticky prices 20.39 .73 4 .21 0 .45 .1
h) Case (g) adding CPI-indexed transfers 16.45 .42 9 .76 .24 .3
Empirical Estimates 7.2∗ 2.5￿ 45.0∗ 1.8￿ 3.5￿
∗Oct. 1997￿Oct. 1998.
￿Average rate between Nov. 1998 and Aug. 2002.
￿Seigniorage is measured monthly through Sep. 2002. Debt de￿a t i o ni sm e a s u r e dm o n t h l y
through Nov. 2002, and includes an estimate of future debt de￿ation. The implicit ￿scal
reforms are measured annually through 2001.
38TABLE 6
Outstanding Domestic Debt
Value Maturities Average Mos.
Outstanding to Maturity
(a) Korea, End of October 1997 (trillion won)
Grain securities 4.9 1, 3 and 5 yrs. n.a.
Subway construction bond 3.0 3 yrs. n.a.
National housing bond 12.7 5￿10 yrs. n.a.
FX stabilization fund bonds 4.0 1￿5 yrs. n.a.
Treasury bonds 5.8 1￿10 yrs. n.a.
Monetary stabilization bonds 26.4
0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4.5,
6, 12, 18 mos.
n.a.
Industrial ￿nance debentures 17.1 1￿10 yrs. n.a.
(b) Mexico, End of September 1994 (billion pesos)
Cetes 42.2 1, 3, 6 and 12 mos. n.a.
Ajustabonos 29.5 3 and 5 yrs. n.a.
(c) Turkey, End of January 2001 (quadrillion TL)
Government Bonds (cash) 0.7 1 Yr. 5.9
14.7 Irregular 1￿2 Yrs 7.0
2.9 2 Yrs. 11.7
2.0 Irregular 2￿3 Yrs. 18.3
1.1 3 Yrs. 18.3
Government Bonds (noncash) 11.4 50.0
Treasury Bills (cash) 0.8 3 Mos. 1.6
0.1 Irregular 3￿6 Mos. 3.7
0.9 6 Months 5.4
0.1 Irregular 6￿9 Mos. 5.6
0.9 Irregular 9￿12 Mos. 4.9
Treasury Bills (noncash) 0.0 1.0
Sources: See Data Appendix.
39TABLE 7
New Sources of Government Finance
%o fG D P %o fT o t a lC o s t
(a) Korea
Seigniorage 1.77 .6
Debt de￿ation 3.51 5 .7
Implicit decline in transfers 7.53 3 .6
Implicit decline in purchases￿taxes −3.1 −13.9
TOTAL FINANCING TO DATE 9.64 2 .9
(b) Mexico
Seigniorage 1.77 .0
Debt de￿ation 1.77 .2
Implicit decline in transfers 23.49 7 .9
Implicit decline in purchases￿taxes −14.3 −59.8
TOTAL FINANCING TO DATE 12.55 2 .2
(c) Turkey
Seigniorage 1.89 .6
Debt de￿ation 7.33 8 .2
Implicit decline in transfers 5.32 7 .5
Implicit decline in purchases￿taxes −4.1 −21.6




EQUILIBRIUM PATHS IMPLIED BY THE MODEL 
 






































Note: The benchmark model (a) is our full model with nontradable goods, distribution 
costs, sticky prices, nominal debt, and CPI-indexed transfers.  The basic textbook 
model (b) has none of these features. 
 





































































































































































































Notes:  The quantity of debt maturing is sum of the face values (in won) of all debt 
maturing within each time period divided by the exchange rate (won/dollar).  Debt 
deflation is unanticipated revenue from the decline in the dollar value of domestic debt.  























































Notes: Real GDP is measured in trillions of constant 1995 won, and expressed in 
logarithms in the chart.  The GDP deflator is an index number equal to 100 in 1995 and 
expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The exchange rate is measured in won per dollar 
and is expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The trends were calculated as described in 
the text. 
 

























































































x Projection  44
FIGURE 4 
 






































Notes: The trends in government revenue, purchases and transfers were estimated as 
described in the text.  Negative ￿revenue changes￿ indicate an additional fiscal cost to the 
government.  Positive ￿declines￿ in purchases and transfers indicate additional financing 
for the government.  Calculations used in defining the time series in (b), (d) and (f) are 








































































































































Notes:  The quantity of debt maturing is sum of the face values (in pesos) of all debt 
maturing within each time period divided by the exchange rate (pesos/dollar).  Debt 
deflation is unanticipated revenue from the decline in the dollar value of domestic debt.  






















Debt deflation Debt maturing  46
FIGURE 6 
 





























Notes: Real GDP is measured in billions of constant 1993 pesos, and expressed in 
logarithms in the chart.  The GDP deflator is an index number equal to 100 in 1993 and 
expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The exchange rate is measured in pesos per dollar 
and is expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The trends were calculated as described in 
the text. 
 






































































































































Notes: The trends in government revenue, purchases and transfers were estimated as 
described in the text.  Negative ￿revenue changes￿ indicate an additional fiscal cost to the 
government.  Positive ￿declines￿ in purchases and transfers indicate additional financing 
for the government.  Calculations used in defining the time series in (b), (d) and (f) are 

























































































































p Effect Explicit reform  48
FIGURE 8 
 




















Notes:  The quantity of debt maturing is sum of the face values (in TL) of all debt 
maturing within each time period divided by the exchange rate (TL/dollar).  Debt 
deflation is unanticipated revenue from the decline in the dollar value of domestic debt.  



















































Notes: Real GDP is measured in billions of constant 1987 TL, and expressed in 
logarithms in the chart.  The GDP deflator is an index number equal to 100 in 1987 and 
expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The exchange rate is measured in TL per dollar and 
is expressed in logarithms in the chart.  The trends were calculated as described in the 
text. 
 






























































































































Notes: The trends in government revenue, purchases and transfers were estimated as 
described in the text.  Negative ￿revenue changes￿ indicate an additional fiscal cost to the 
government.  Positive ￿declines￿ in purchases and transfers indicate additional financing 
for the government.  Calculations used in defining the time series in (b), (d) and (f) are 
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52Data Sources
Exchange Rates For monthly and annual data we used the International Monetary Fund￿s
International Financial Statistics (IFS) series AE...ZF (end-of-period) and AF...ZF (period-
average) which are measured in local currency units per U.S. dollar. We used end-of-period
￿gures when converting end-of-period stocks measured in units of local currency to dollar
measures. We used period-average ￿gures when converting local currency ￿ows to dollars.
CPI For monthly data we used the IFS series 64...ZF.
Monetary Base For monthly end-of-period data we used the IFS data series reserve
money, 14...ZF.
Interest Rates For Korea we used data from the IFS on the money market interest rate
(60B..ZF), time deposits at deposit money banks (60L..ZF), lending rates of deposit money
banks (60P..ZF), and yields on national housing bonds (61...ZF). These data all pertain to
won-denominated assets. We computed equivalent dollar returns using our exchange rate
data for Korea.
For Mexico and Turkey we used data on Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) and
EMBI+ spreads. We used the EMBI spread for Mexico and the EMBI+ spread for Turkey
(there is no EMBI spread for Turkey). Our source for these data was Bloomberg. The data
pertain to the spreads over US interest rates on dollar-denominated assets. We combined
the spread information with information on 3-month US Treasury Bill rates from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Release H.15 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/) in order to generate dollar interest rates.
Cost of the Banking Sector Bailout F o rK o r e a ,w eu s et h ee s t i m a t ep r o v i d e db y
Standard and Poor￿s (2000). As of December 1999, they estimated that the ￿scal cost of the
banking crisis would be roughly 24 percent of 1997 GDP, or 114.4 billion dollars.
For Mexico, Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) estimate the ￿scal cost of the crisis to be
6.5 percent of GDP, which amounts to 27 billion dollars. On the other hand, Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996) estimate the cost to be between 12 and 15 percent of GDP, with the upper
bound translating into 63 billion dollars.
For Turkey we use the estimate provided by Burnside (2002), 36.2 billion dollars, which
is based on a detailed analysis of the changes in Turkey￿s ￿noncash￿ domestic debt stock
between January and December 2001.
National Income Accounts Data We use national income accounts data to get mea-
sures of real and nominal GDP, their expenditure and production components, and the
relevant de￿ators. Our data for Korea were obtained from the Bank of Korea website,
http://www.bok.or.kr/, Statistics, Statistics Database, National Accounts page, HLHA,
HLHB, HLHC, and HLHD sections. Our data for Mexico were obtained from the website of
Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica, Geograf￿a e InformÆtica (INEGI), http://www.inegi.gob.mx
/difusion/espanol/￿econs.html. For Turkey our data were obtained from the Bank of Turkey￿s
Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS) website, http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html,
General Statistics, ￿GNP at Current Prices,￿ and ￿GNP at Fixed Prices￿ pages.
53Fiscal Data For Korea we measured government purchases as the sum of the government
consumption and government capital formation series in the national income accounts (de-
scribed above). For revenue, we used the series ￿revenue of general government￿ from the
￿Income/outlay of general government￿ table on the National Statistical Oﬃce￿s website
http://www.nso.go.kr/eng/. For transfer spending, we used the sum of the series ￿subsi-
dies,￿ ￿social security bene￿ts,￿ ￿social assistance bene￿ts,￿ and ￿current transfers N.E.C.￿
from the same table.
For Mexico we measured government purchases as the average of two series: (i) the sum
of the government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure series
in the national income accounts (described above) and (ii) the sum of the series for current
expenditures (excluding transfers and interest) and capital expenditure provided by Banco de
Mexico at http://www.banxico.org.mx/siteBanxicoINGLES/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanc-
iera.html. For revenue, we used the series ￿consolidated budgetary revenues￿ from the same
Banco de Mexico website. For Mexico we used the sum of two series from the same website:
(i) ￿net transfers￿ and (ii) a fraction of ￿revenue sharing to state and local governments￿ cor-
responding to the share of federal transfer spending in federal spending other than transfers
to state and local governments.
For Turkey we measured government purchases as the sum of government consumption
expenditure and public sector investment expenditure as de￿ned in the national income
accounts (described above). For revenue we used the series ￿revenues￿ from the page ￿Con-
solidated Budget (Treasury)￿ at the Bank of Turkey EDDS website (describe above). For
transfers we used the series ￿other transfers￿ from the same page.
Data on Nominal Debt Our data on Korea￿s stocks of diﬀerent domestic debt instru-
ments were obtained from the National Statistics Oﬃce website, http://www.stat.go.kr/cgi-
bin/bbs/imain.cgi, and were originally sourced from the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of
Finance and Economy.
Our data for Mexico￿s stocks of diﬀerent domestic debt instruments were obtained from
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP): http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/eofp
/cuadros/E01I1994.html.
Our data for Turkey￿s stocks of diﬀerent domestic debt instruments at the end of Jan-
uary 2001 were obtained from the Turkish Treasury website, http://www.treasury.gov.tr/
english/debtstat.htm, 2001 spreadsheet, Table 4: Maturity Composition of Outstanding
Debt.
54Technical Appendix
A Discrete Time Approximation to the Model In this section we describe a discrete
time approximation to our model. We divide time into small intervals each of length n
years. So, for example, n =1 /12 would imply that time was being measured in months. The
variable t is used here to index these time intervals. All ￿ow variables de￿n e di nt h em a i n
text are measured as ￿ows per small interval but are expressed at annual rates.



















The household￿s disposable income is
y
D






￿ vt +￿ vt − τt. (6.2)
The representative agent￿s ￿ow budget constraint for t ≥ 0 is given by:





















t = P N
t /St, pT
t = P T
t /St =1+δpN
t ,a n dZt/n represents household saving, measured
at annual rates.
Iterating on the ￿ow budget constraint starting at time 0, we have
a−1 =( 1 + nr)









































t ) ≤ Mt. (6.6)
55Solving the Household Problem The Lagrangean for the household￿s problem is







































The ￿rst-order conditions, other than the constraints, are
c
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−1 =( Λtn + Θtη)p
N
t
at : Λt = Λt+1(1 + nr)

































−1 =( λtn + θtη)p
N
t (6.8)




/(1 + ρn)+θt (6.10)
The Government Budget Constraint The government￿s ￿o wb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s :
















￿ vt +￿ vt + v
∗





Here Xt/n represents the government￿s primary surplus.























If we aggregate (6.3) and (6.11) we get a ￿ow resource constraint for tradables:
at − bt =( 1+nr)(at−1 − bt−1)+Zt − Xt,
or
ft =( 1+nr)ft−1 + Zt − Xt, (6.14)
where ft = at − bt is the country￿s net foreign asset position. Notice that














−(t+1)(Zt − Xt)=0 . (6.15)
The Sustainable Fixed Exchange Rate Regime We assume that the government holds
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ec o n s t a n ta ts o m el e v e lS.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tgT
t = gT, gN
t = gN, yT
t = yT,
yN
t = yN, τL
t = τL, ￿ vt =￿ v, ￿ vt =￿ v, v∗
t = v∗,a n dMt = M for all t. We conjecture that the
solution to the model in this case has the property that P N
t = PN for all t and, therefore,
that Pt = P T = S +δP N for all t. It follows that pN
t = pN = P N/S and pT
t = pT =1+δpN
for all t.W ea l s oh a v ecN
t = cN, cT
t = cT,a n dat = a−1 for all t.






The lifetime resource constraint for tradables, (6.15), combined with (6.13) implies
c










Next consider the household￿s problem. Notice that the household￿s ￿rst-order condition
for at implies λt = λ for all t. From this result and the ￿rst-order condition for Mt we have
θt = ρnλ/(1 + ρn) for all t. Eliminating θ, the household￿s ￿rst-order conditions for cT and
cN c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
nc
1−σω/c














Given our previous results, the unknowns in these two equations are λ and pN.T a k e n




ωcN − (1 − ω)cTδ
. (6.19)




and PT = pTS.
When we calibrate the model we choose the arbitrary normalization yT = yN =1and
set the relative price of nontradables to a value pN consistent with the share of nontradables
in GDP in the model, pN/(1 + pN), being equal to the corresponding value in our data set.
We set gT and gN consistent with the data, and set v∗ =0 . Notice that this implies that
(6.16), (6.17), and (6.19) then form a system of three equations which can be solved for three
unknowns: cT, cN,a n df−1.








θ = ρnλ/(1 + ρn). (6.22)







We have τt = τ = τTyT + τNpNyN + τL, gt = gT + pNgN,a n dvt = v =￿ vP/S +￿ v + v∗.
Hence, the government￿s lifetime budget constraint implies that
τ = rb−1 + g + v + rB/S. (6.24)
The Crisis We assume that the crisis involves an increase in the present value of transfers.
In particular, we assume that
‰
￿ vt + v∗
t =￿ v + v∗ for 0 ≤ t<T 0,
￿ vt + v∗



















Here φ = ￿ φ + φ
∗ represents the total cost of a bailout of the banking sector.
The government sets the money supply equal to Mt = MT(1 + ￿n)t−T for t ≥ T.O n c e
the information about the increase in prospective de￿cits arrives at time 0, the money supply
is initially ￿xed at some level M in order to keep the exchange rate ￿xed. Date t∗ is the ￿rst
date at which, with the exchange rate still ￿xed at S, the demand for money falls from M
to M(1 − χ),w i t hχ > 0.A tt h a tp o i n tt h eg o v e r n m e n ta b a n d o n st h e￿xed exchange rate





M 0 ≤ t<t ∗
M(1 − χ) t∗ ≤ t<T
MT(1 + ￿n)t−T t ≥ T.
58The implications of the crisis for the government￿s lifetime budget constraint are as
follows. Notice that under the sustainable ￿x e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ew eh a d
Xt = X = n
￿





Mt = M, and consequently that b−1 +X/(nr)=0 . We can substitute for b−1 a n dt h e nn o t e














Some Assumptions We will establish that the economy enters a post-crisis steady state
at a date we de￿ne as ﬂ T +1 .I nt h ec a s eo f￿exible prices we will show that ﬂ T = T.I no u r
model of sticky prices, we assume PN
t = PN for t ≤ Tp.F o r t>T p we assume that P N
t
moves in proportion to the exchange rate. In particular, we let PN
t =( P N/STp)St, implying
that pN
t =ﬂ pN = PN/STp for t>T p.W ea s s u m et h a tTp ≥ T +1 .29 We will show that this
implies ﬂ T = Tp − 1.
We assume yT
t = yT, yN
t = yN, gT
t = gT and gN
t = gN for all t.
The Post-Crisis Steady State: t ≥ ﬂ T Equation (6.9), above, implies λt = λ for all t.
We do not yet solve for the constant λ. Instead we conjecture a solution in which cT
t =ﬂ cT
for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 . Our algorithm for solving the model begins with an outer loop in which we
guess the value of ﬂ cT.
Given our assumptions about yN
t and gN






N − δﬂ c
T,f o rt ≥ ﬂ T +1 . (6.26)
It follows that ct =ﬂ c ≡ (ﬂ cT)ω(ﬂ cN)1−ω for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 .W ec o n j e c t u r et h a tSt+1/St =1+￿n
for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 .D e ￿ning N ≡ (1 + ρn)(1 + ￿n), we then have, from (6.10),
θt = ﬂ θ = λ
N − 1
N
,f o rt ≥ ﬂ T +1 . (6.27)
The ￿rst-order condition for cT














When nontradable prices are ￿exible, the ￿rst-order condition for cN
t , (6.8), implies pN
t =
PN
t /St is a constant ﬂ pN for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 ,w h e r e
nﬂ c










29We do this for technical reasons. If we assumed otherwise, the model would be much harder to solve for
t∗ <t≤ T.
59Notice that (6.28) and (6.29) can be solved for λ and ﬂ pN:
ﬂ p
N =
(1 − ω)ﬂ cT
ωﬂ cN − δ(1 − ω)ﬂ cT (6.30)
and
λ =
nNﬂ c1−σ(1 − ω)
[nN +( N − 1)η]ﬂ pNﬂ cN . (6.31)
Sticky Prices
When nontradable prices are sticky they do not clear the market for nontradables after
the crisis. In particular, there will usually either be excess demand, in which case non-
tradables are rationed to households (whose ￿rst-order conditions don￿t hold), or there will
be excess supply, in which case resources are wasted. In our examples, the relative price
eﬀects ￿underprice￿ nontradables for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 . Hence we want to look at cases where the
household￿s ￿rst-order condition for nontradables is violated.
The cash-in-advance constraint tells us
M¯ T+1 = η
£











We know that cT
¯ T+1 =ﬂ cT, cN
¯ T+1 =ﬂ cN, M¯ T+1 = MT(1 + ￿n)
¯ T+1−T,a n dPN
¯ T+1 = P N
Tp = P N.I n
this case we can write
MT(1 + ￿n)
¯ T+1−T = η
£
S ¯ T+1ﬂ c






S ¯ T+1 =
MT(1 + ￿n)
¯ T+1−T − η(δﬂ cT +ﬂ cN)P N
ηﬂ cT . (6.32)
Then we have ﬂ pN = PN/S ¯ T+1. From (6.28) we can solve for λ:
λ =
nNﬂ c1−σω/ﬂ cT
[Nn+( N − 1)η](1+δﬂ pN)
. (6.33)
In both cases, ﬂ θ can then be determined using (6.27). It is useful to note that real
balances, Mt/St =ﬂ m,ac o n s t a n t ,f o rt ≥ ﬂ T +1 ,w h e r e





Hence, St = Mt/ﬂ m for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 . This, of course, veri￿es our guess that St+1/St =1+￿n
for t ≥ ﬂ T +1 ,s i n c eMt+1/Mt =1+￿n for t ≥ T and T ≤ ﬂ T.
The Pre-Crisis Period: 0 ≤ t<t ∗ We assume St = S for 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗.G i v e n t h a t w e
know λt = λ for all t,w eh a v e
θt = θ = λ
ρn
1+ρn
for 0 ≤ t<t
∗. (6.35)
60Given our other assumptions, we conjecture a solution in which cT
t = cT, cN
t = cN,a n d
PN




















1−ω⁄1−σ (1 − ω)(c
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When nontradable prices are ￿exible, all of these equations hold. When nontradable prices
are sticky, either (6.37) or (6.38) does not hold.
Flexible Prices
We can write cN as cN(cT) using (6.38) and then use (6.37) to write pN as pN(cT).W e











−1 =( λn + θη)[1 + δp
N(c
T)]. (6.39)
Once one has the solution for cT, it is straightforward to again use (6.38) and (6.37) to solve
for cN and pN.
Sticky Prices
Since we assume that P N
t = PN for t ≤ Tp,w eh a v epN
t = pN = pN = P N/S for
0 ≤ t ≤ t∗.T o s o l v e f o r cT and cN we ￿rst assume that (6.36) and (6.37) hold and that





















Using these solutions we check whether yN − gN − δcT − cN ≥ 0.I fi ti sw es t o p .
If the condition we checked in the previous paragraph is violated, then we abandon the
household￿s ￿rst order condition for cN
t , (6.37), and impose the resource constraint, (6.38),










=( λn + θη)(1 + δp
N)c
T. (6.42)
We then use (6.38) to solve for cN.
For either ￿exible or sticky prices we use the cash-in-advance constraint to solve for









61The Transition Period: t∗ ≤ t ≤ ﬂ T We have Mt = M(1 − χ) for t∗ ≤ t<Tand
Mt = MT(1 + ￿n)t−T for t ≥ T. We will recursively generate St starting from t∗,w h e r ew e
have assumed St∗ = S. We will then work forward, allowing us to take St as given when
solving for the other variables. Starting from t = t∗, we then solve for θt, cT
t , cN
t , pN
t ,a n d
from these determine the next value of St.
Flexible Prices
Under ￿exible prices we use the cash-in-advance constraint, (6.6), the two consumption
￿rst-order conditions, (6.7) and (6.8), and the resource constraint for nontradables, (6.13),
to solve for cT
t , cN
t , pN







































t ),a n dθt(cT










1−σ =[ λn + θt(c
T










When prices are sticky we will use (6.6), (6.7), and either (6.8) or (6.13) to solve for θt,
cT
t ,a n dcN
t . Assuming that (6.13) is the equation that does not hold with equality, we can
solve for θt, cT
t ,a n dcN
t as follows. Implicitly (6.6) de￿nes cN





Mt − η(St + δP N)cT
t
ηPN .
W ec a nt h e nu s e( 6 . 8 )t oo b t a i nθt i nt e r m so ft h i ss o l u t i o nf o rcN




















Then we can solve the remaining equation, (6.7), for cT
t , using the same method described
above for the ￿exible price case.
If at any point (6.13) is violated, in that cN
t is too large, we must let the ￿rst-order
condition for cN
t be violated. In this case we solve (6.6), (6.7), and (6.13) for θt, cT
t ,a n dcN
t .
Notice that (6.6) and (6.13), are linear in cT
t and cN
t , and do not involve θt.H e n c e ,w ec a n
solve ￿





















Mt − ηPN(yN − gN)
η(St + δP N)(yN − gN) − δMt
‚
/(ηSt).







t )−1 − λn(1 + δP N/St)
η(1 + δPN/St)
.
Regardless of whether prices are sticky or ￿exible, once we have θt, cT
t , cN
t ,a n dpN
t ,w e







Iterating on χ When we are done generating the data for the transition period we will
have a sequence {St} for t∗ <t< ﬂ T +1 . Notice that the S ¯ T+1 generated this way may
not match the S¯ T+1 w eg e n e r a t e di nt h es e c t i o no nt h ep o s t - c r i s i ss t e a d ys t a t e . I fi td o e s
not match, then the value of χ must be changed. If the ￿transition period￿ value of S ¯ T+1 is
greater than the ￿steady-state￿ value of S ¯ T+1, then we make χ smaller.
Iterating on ﬂ cT The lifetime budget constraint of the household, (6.5), must be satis￿ed.








We can rewrite the lifetime budget constraint as


































The right hand side of (6.48), which I will denote by RHS, is seigniorage. Notice that
RHS =( 1 + nr)
−1M − M
S













−(¯ T+1) ￿ﬂ m
(1 + ￿n)r
.
We can compute the relevant pieces of the left-hand side as follows. De￿ne LHS1 ≡
P∞
t=0(1+



























Z1 for 0 ≤ t<t ∗





































(1 + nr)−( ¯ T+1)
nr
ﬂ Z1. (6.49)
We also have LHS2 ≡
P∞










(1 + nr)−(¯ T+1)
(N − 1)M¯ T/ﬂ m
.
We have LHS3 ≡
P∞
t=0(1 + nr)−(t+1)n￿ vPt/St so that


















If we ￿nd that the household￿s lifetime budget constraint in not satis￿ed, we change our
guess for ﬂ cT.
Iterating on ￿ Here we must evaluate the government￿s lifetime budget constraint, given































can show that LHSG
1 = ΓgN and LHSG
2 = −ΓτNyN where












−(¯ T+1) ﬂ pN
r
.
If the government￿s lifetime budget constraint is not satis￿ed, we adjust our guess for ￿.
64